The Education Gadfly Weekly

Paul E. Peterson
The Belknap Press, Harvard University Press
2010

In these 300 pages, Harvard’s Paul Peterson retells the history of American public education through the lives of six influential leaders. He argues that Horace Mann, John Dewey, Martin Luther King, Jr., Albert Shanker, William Bennett, and James Coleman all tried yet ultimately failed to achieve their respective goals, many of which included customizing education to the individual child. What happened instead was an unintended march toward ever-greater centralization. But where they failed, Peterson insists, virtual education may yet succeed. He poses a new leader: Julie Young of the Florida Virtual School, a state-wide virtual charter that points toward a new form of “mass customization”. The book is provocative, for sure, though some readers may question whether “customization” was really yesterday’s goal—and whether virtual education is powerful enough to produce it at scale tomorrow, particularly in the face of claims that a strong democracy needs the “common” school more than the individualized kind. You can buy a copy here.

Mary Cullinane and Frederick M. Hess, eds.
Harvard Education Press
2010

Even though it hasn’t graduated its first class of seniors, the School of the Future in Philadelphia—a Microsoft-supported, high-tech, high school serving mainly low-income kids—has become one of today’s most-studied living test tubes for whole-school reform. This insightful book is full of some important and sobering lessons on its promise and perils. Its chapters include contributions from SOF teachers and administrators as well as policy analysts and scholars (including Fordham’s Finn). One bothersome question arches over all of them: How much do we care about “scalability”? The editors write in their introduction that “SOF is particularly noteworthy because of its declared intent to craft a reproducible and scalable design.”Indeed, the school’s founders explicitly decided not to make it a charter school to prove that transformation could come even to regular public schools operating within district regulations. In so doing, however, they subjected their venture to untold risks and restrictions, even as they built a very intricate curriculum from scratch and invested an enormous amount of time customizing technology. Whether this heavily studied test-tube school ever leaves the lab remains to be seen. Buy it here.

Manyee Wong, Thomas D. Cook, and Peter M. Steiner
Institute for Policy Research, Northwestern University 
January 2010

The density of this paper’s title is a good indication of what you’ll find inside, but it's still worth your attention. It tells us that No Child Left Behind (NCLB) has improved pupil achievement in math (and maybe also in grade 4 reading), and, even more importantly, that standards and tests matter when they are attached to consequences. Using (main and trend) NAEP data from 1990 to 2009, it tests the relationship between student achievement and pre- and post- NCLB sanctions. As control groups, it uses Catholic and secular private schools, largely untouched by NCLB. The authors found a statistically-significant increase in math achievement for students in public schools during the NCLB era under one of two conditions: either the state had additional sanctions on top of NCLB’s and/or it had high proficiency standards (as measured by its cut scores). In states where one or both of these conditions was met, students gained six to seven months of math in grade 4 and a full twelve months of math in grade 8. Reading results were weaker and less certain, seen only in states with both conditions and only in grade 4. But the lesson is tantalizing (and surely comforting to supporters of NCLB and kindred state accountability regimes): Sanctions can work when tied to meaningful metrics. Check it out here.

The most dangerous word in the education-reform lexicon is “stakeholder” and the most problematic among the infinite theories that reformers espouse is that widespread “stakeholder buy-in” is essential if anything is actually to change.

My own experience these past zillion years is that demanding lots of buy-in is a reliable way to ensure that nothing much changes, at least nothing beyond enlarging the total pie so that every “stakeholder” gets a bigger slice.

The problem, of course, is that the “stakeholders” in K-12 education always turn out to be producers, not consumers. They are the grown-ups who earn their livings (or their members’ or shareholders’ livings) from the money spent by the education system. Remember that about three-fourths of the typical school-system budget goes for salaries and benefits—for grown-ups. And nearly all the rest goes to buy things that grown-ups benefit from selling, such as textbooks, teacher-education, in-service training, computers, football uniforms, building maintenance services, school buses, etc.

Those self-interested grown-ups turn out to be the “stakeholders.” It’s never kids, parents or taxpayers. And those stakeholders are vigilant, to say the least, in defending their interests. They hire lobbyists, campaign for candidates, appear at school board meetings and legislative hearings, and “bargain” not only for pay and benefits but also for hours, guaranteed free time, you name it. Hence a meeting of stakeholders in K-12 education typically produces a room full of teacher-union representatives, ed-school deans, state bureaucrats, textbook publishers, agents of the principals and superintendents—and sometimes of bus drivers, custodians, and cafeteria workers. You won’t find any students or parents or the hard-working nurses, taxi drivers, accountants, and grocers whose own pay is reduced by tax withholding so that the “stakeholders’” interests can be sustained.

Sure, a case can be made for obtaining stakeholder “buy-in” when some sort of change or reform is contemplated—and that’s the case that Secretary Duncan and his team have been making in connection with states’ Race to the Top applications. It boils down to this: Nothing will actually change on the ground—or behind the classroom door—unless those who must implement the reform agree to support it. Absent such support, the governor or state superintendent can promise, the legislature can mandate, the mayor can announce, but it’s only hopeful persiflage and lip service until and unless those who do the actual work assent to do things differently.

That’s not totally wrong. But neither is it exactly right. For big changes—in education, in foreign policy, in dietary practices, you name it—almost never occur because everybody affected by them agrees in advance that they should occur. People aren’t like that. The only kind of change that most people—and, heaven save us, most “associations”—will readily assent to amounts to “more of the same.” Real change occurs with duress, in response to leadership, in defiance of habit, resistance, inertia, and obduracy. Real change occurs because someone manages to place the needs and interests of children, parents, and taxpayers ahead of the interests of the putative stakeholders that normally prevail. (Among innumerable examples: Teach For America, charter schools, pay for performance, standards-based accountability.)

Once in a while, in response to uncommonly good fortune, ingenious leadership, or other rare circumstances, the stars line up in such a way that the customary stakeholders can be persuaded to agree to do things differently. Of course, this almost always hinges on more money flowing to them, which is what has happened—and is happening today—in connection with Race to the Top. That probably accounts for Delaware’s success in persuading Duncan’s reviewers that “the First State” had sufficient “buy-in” from its school districts and teacher unions. That may be what happened in Tennessee, too (though one is heartened by reports of extraordinary gubernatorial leadership in the Volunteer State).

Most of the time, however, it’s folly to demand universal stakeholder “buy-in,” to expect it to come attached to serious education reform, or to ding states for obtaining only partial buy-in. Else the reforms will simply be watered down to a sufficiently diluted level that the stakeholders (in return for more money) will tolerate. To demand such buy-in in most states, moreover, is self-defeating. In Florida, for example, Race to the Top would be a stunning success if about five major urban districts “bought in” to its precepts.(Youcan name them, too.) Same with Pennsylvania and Ohio and…well, most places. Who really cares if Alachua County signs on? Or Burgettstown (PA)? Or Mt. Vernon (north of Columbus, OH)? The more buy-in that’s required, the greater the risk of pallid “least-common-denominator” reform. And the more certain that whatever reforms do occur in response to federal money will go away when that money stops flowing.

With the ink still damp on Race to the Top’s first round winners’ checks, the Education Department has launched its next stimulus-funded competition: $350 million to “consortia” of states to develop “common assessments” in alignment with “common standards.” These funds are a portion of Duncan’s discretionary kitty, which he announced in February he would set aside for such a test-development contest.

Back then, we mused that the competition might lock in some incredibly consequential decisions about the future of national testing in the United States. And sure enough, one likely outcome is already clear: There will probably be two sets of national tests for elementary and middle school students, and maybe another one at the high school level, at least if the three known “consortia” of states all succeed in winning pieces of the testing pie:

1. A group led by Achieve and nicknamed the “Florida” consortium;
2. A new consortium of consortia, joining three previously separate groups under the leadership of Stanford’s Linda Darling-Hammond; and
3. An assembly headed by the National Center for Education and the Economy (NCEE) that’s focusing on a $30 million subset of the $350 million reserved for new high-school tests.

The groups are still fluid and many states have signed on to more than one of them. Education Week’s Catherine Gewertz reports that “Florida” has thirty members, Darling-Hammond’s coalition, forty, and NCEE eight.

With applications due in June and awards to be made in September, much is at stake and many questions need answering. Four that jump out:

1. What will these coalitions look like in their final form? Gewertz culls this down to two issues: Is NCEE really the only applicant for the high-school dollars? And where do the nation’s testing giants, like the College Board, fit into all this?
2. What if the Common Core standards in their final form turn out to be dramatically different than the drafts now circulating? The testing consortia won’t know until days before their own proposals are due at ED—and maybe not at all, if there’s further slippage of the standards-revision timetable.
3. What will it mean for America to have one set of common standards but multiple tests “aligned” with them? Will results on the various assessments be comparable to one another? Do we risk losing the potential benefits that could come from a single national yardstick?
4. How will this work over time? Will one body of some sort oversee the common standards, while separate institutions oversee three separate testing efforts? How will these groups work together? Will they split any future federal funding? And according to what formula?

For better or worse, this process is plunging ahead whether these questions get answered or not. It’s bold, it’s brave, it’s forward looking—and it’s a wee bit scary. Here’s hoping we land on workable solutions.

So why did Tennessee and Delaware win in the first round of Race to the Top? The growing consensus is that the crucial factor was “stakeholder support” (buy-in from unions, districts, etc.). Each was able to get all of its districts and virtually all of its unions (Tennessee got 93 percent) to sign on to the state’s proposal.

This interpretation is not wholly unwarranted. There are a significant number of RTTT points tied directly to stakeholder support, and some peer reviewers downgraded applications in other states for insufficient buy-in. Moreover, in his earliest comments on announcement day, Secretary Duncan emphasized Tennessee’s and Delaware’s respective ability to craft statewide plans that earned the unions’ benediction. (In fact, the administration seemed to back away from this line of argument only when observers noted that elevating stakeholder support has a dangerous consequence: It gives them a virtual veto over state plans.)

But the story is more complicated than “anti-reform stakeholders triumph.” As I noted immediately after the awards were announced, support isn’t everything. A number of states with 100 percent buy-in from unions and districts didn’t win because their proposals were weak on substance. Likewise, a number of states with little buy-in did quite well because they promised major reforms.

So on the whole, which is more important? Substance.

Yes, Tennessee and Delaware scored highly in the “state success factors” category (where stakeholder support is embedded), besting frontrunners Florida, Louisiana, and Rhode Island, which had less support.

But they also had consistently high scores in other key categories. Florida lost significant points in the data, teachers, and failing-schools sections. Louisiana came up short in the standards, data, and STEM sections. Rhode Island lost big on data and charter schools.

These states could recoup many more points by focusing on serious reform instead of greater stakeholder buy-in. Watering down a proposal to generate buy-in is not a path to success. Indeed, Colorado, which publicly backed away from teacher reforms in order to appease stakeholders, was severely penalized in the teachers section, scoring fourteenth out of sixteen finalists. Kentucky was able to generate perfect union and district support by, among other things, rejecting charter legislation in advance of the filing deadline. But that cost it 32 points that would have put the Bluegrass State in the winner’s circle.

In my view, the administration erred by granting so many points to stakeholder support. Though broad buy-in facilitates program implementation, requiring it empowers groups traditionally hostile to reform (as Finn argues above).

But states willing to be bold on reform can win without tons of buy-in because there are plenty of points to be had elsewhere. My advice going forward is for states to totally commit to reform, maximize those points, and then build as large a coalition as possible around that bold plan—not the reverse order.

If a state follows that path and still loses in round two due to lost points attributable to recalcitrant stakeholders, its frustration would be justified. But that’s extraordinarily unlikely because it would mean at least fifteen other states crafted remarkably bold plans and managed comprehensive stakeholder support. (Duncan has intimated that as many as fifteen states will win in round two.) If that happens, Race to the Top will have been a stunning success, and we would find ourselves hard-pressed to complain.

The land of 10,000 lakes is not keen on letting 1,000 flowers bloom. Nearly a year ago, the Minnesota legislature decided to ramp up expectations for charter school authorizers. It put in place a more rigorous process to qualify as an authorizer and required more direct contact between authorizer and school. The changes responded to a state audit that revealed major problems, the most egregious of which was the fact that a few authorizers had little to no interaction with their schools after initially sponsoring them. But now that the new rules are going into effect, some authorizers want out. Half of the fourteen districts that currently serve as authorizers, as well as the state department of education itself, are thinking of jumping ship, i.e. getting out of sponsorship altogether. (Minnesota presently has fifty-two separate authorizing bodies.) They claim they don’t have the resources or manpower to handle authorization under the new rules. Some charter supporters are worried, fretting over a possible shortage of authorizers, and concerned that some schools mind not find new sponsors in time to stay open. We’re more sanguine. As we know from direct experience in Ohio, authorizing schools is hard work; only organizations committed to doing it right should be in the game—and it’s altogether possible for a state to have too many sponsors.

“Minnesota districts cutting ties to charter schools,” by Gregory A. Patterson, Minneapolis Star Tribune, March 28, 2010

Manyee Wong, Thomas D. Cook, and Peter M. Steiner
Institute for Policy Research, Northwestern University 
January 2010

The density of this paper’s title is a good indication of what you’ll find inside, but it's still worth your attention. It tells us that No Child Left Behind (NCLB) has improved pupil achievement in math (and maybe also in grade 4 reading), and, even more importantly, that standards and tests matter when they are attached to consequences. Using (main and trend) NAEP data from 1990 to 2009, it tests the relationship between student achievement and pre- and post- NCLB sanctions. As control groups, it uses Catholic and secular private schools, largely untouched by NCLB. The authors found a statistically-significant increase in math achievement for students in public schools during the NCLB era under one of two conditions: either the state had additional sanctions on top of NCLB’s and/or it had high proficiency standards (as measured by its cut scores). In states where one or both of these conditions was met, students gained six to seven months of math in grade 4 and a full twelve months of math in grade 8. Reading results were weaker and less certain, seen only in states with both conditions and only in grade 4. But the lesson is tantalizing (and surely comforting to supporters of NCLB and kindred state accountability regimes): Sanctions can work when tied to meaningful metrics. Check it out here.

Mary Cullinane and Frederick M. Hess, eds.
Harvard Education Press
2010

Even though it hasn’t graduated its first class of seniors, the School of the Future in Philadelphia—a Microsoft-supported, high-tech, high school serving mainly low-income kids—has become one of today’s most-studied living test tubes for whole-school reform. This insightful book is full of some important and sobering lessons on its promise and perils. Its chapters include contributions from SOF teachers and administrators as well as policy analysts and scholars (including Fordham’s Finn). One bothersome question arches over all of them: How much do we care about “scalability”? The editors write in their introduction that “SOF is particularly noteworthy because of its declared intent to craft a reproducible and scalable design.”Indeed, the school’s founders explicitly decided not to make it a charter school to prove that transformation could come even to regular public schools operating within district regulations. In so doing, however, they subjected their venture to untold risks and restrictions, even as they built a very intricate curriculum from scratch and invested an enormous amount of time customizing technology. Whether this heavily studied test-tube school ever leaves the lab remains to be seen. Buy it here.

Paul E. Peterson
The Belknap Press, Harvard University Press
2010

In these 300 pages, Harvard’s Paul Peterson retells the history of American public education through the lives of six influential leaders. He argues that Horace Mann, John Dewey, Martin Luther King, Jr., Albert Shanker, William Bennett, and James Coleman all tried yet ultimately failed to achieve their respective goals, many of which included customizing education to the individual child. What happened instead was an unintended march toward ever-greater centralization. But where they failed, Peterson insists, virtual education may yet succeed. He poses a new leader: Julie Young of the Florida Virtual School, a state-wide virtual charter that points toward a new form of “mass customization”. The book is provocative, for sure, though some readers may question whether “customization” was really yesterday’s goal—and whether virtual education is powerful enough to produce it at scale tomorrow, particularly in the face of claims that a strong democracy needs the “common” school more than the individualized kind. You can buy a copy here.