Since Ohio’s first charters opened in 1998, students attending these independently operated public schools have found themselves at the short end of the funding stick.
Since Ohio’s first charters opened in 1998, students attending these independently operated public schools have found themselves at the short end of the funding stick. Today in Ohio’s major cities, where most charters are located, charter students receive about $4,000 less per pupil each year for their education than district peers. In total, urban charters are shortchanged by a staggering $253 million annually. Even on shoestring budgets, Ohio’s brick-and-mortar charter schools are outperforming districts, especially when it comes to educating students of color. But the massive funding disparities thwart even the finest charters from reaching more students and helping them fulfill their potential.
Hats off, then, to Governor Mike DeWine, whose budget recommends an increase of $30 million in state aid for quality charters. Yes, it’s true that this amount wouldn’t fill the Grand Canyon sized hole in charter funding. But it would infuse high-performing charters with new funds that can help expand their capacity to serve more students in need of an excellent education. And in a tight operating budget that calls for no tax hikes, it’s great news that quality charters were made a priority. All in all, DeWine offers a shrewd, pragmatic proposal that, if approved by the legislature, would be an important milestone in Ohio’s long journey toward fairer charter funding.
How would it all work? Here’s three things to know.
First, as noted above, the DeWine proposal drives resources to quality charters. These supplemental dollars could be seen as “performance based,” since charter schools have to meet academic targets to receive funds. Eligibility for the $30 million pool hinges on two key state report card metrics. One, the performance index: Charters must score higher on this student proficiency measure than the district where they are located for the two most recent years. And two, the value-added measure: Charters must also earn an A or B rating on the state’s student-growth measure. These are rigorous but reasonable targets because they compare charters’ pupil achievement to like districts and use the more poverty-neutral student growth measure.[1]
The first list of quality schools would be unveiled sometime before the end of January 2020, as the legislation calls for payments by January 31 of the fiscal year. Hence, the FY 2020 list would likely be based on 2018–19 report card ratings, though possibly 2017–18.[2] The list would be updated annually to include any new charters achieving these targets, with schools remaining on the list for two years after their initial designation to provide more certainty in school budgeting.[3] Overall, these quality criteria not only reward and strengthen Ohio’s top-performing charters, but they also create incentives for schools that initially miss academic benchmarks to improve and access these additional dollars.
Second, it targets high-poverty charter schools. In addition to the performance criteria, charter schools must enroll at least 50 percent economically disadvantaged (ED) students to access these funds. Due to geographic restrictions in state law, most charters already serve primarily low-income students and would easily meet this threshold. Nevertheless, the provision does guard against any potential “cherry-picking” of affluent students in an effort to generate funds. But perhaps more importantly, this provision, along with a tiered structure that provides more funds for ED students ($1,750 versus $1,000 per non-ED pupil), ensures that these dollars are steered toward charters doing the most to close stubborn achievement gaps. This targeted approach fits nicely with Governor DeWine’s promises to prioritize the needs of Ohio’s least advantaged children.
The performance and enrollment criteria ensure that high-performing, high-poverty schools receive supplemental funds. Based on 2017–18 report cards, forty-six charters met these criteria; taken together, they enrolled roughly 15,000 students—the vast majority of whom are low-income. The large majority of these schools are located in the very high-poverty Big Eight cities, while the rest are in poorer towns such as Lorain and Mansfield. Though they would be eligible for these funds, no online schools met the performance-based criteria in 2017–18.
Third, it promotes the replication and growth of promising startups. Charter school formation has ground to a halt in recent years, with less than ten schools opening annually. This, along with about twenty closures occurring every year, has led to an overall decline in charter enrollment. Unfortunately, the glacial pace of startups continues to leave countless thousands of needy children without quality options. In an effort to reignite new-school growth, the DeWine proposal allows promising startups to tap these funds in two ways:
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Ohio public charter schools are making a big difference in the lives of students, especially those facing the greatest barriers to success. According to CREDO’s recent evaluation, “The results reveal that Ohio black charter students experience greater yearly progress compared to their TPS [district] peers in both subjects. The surpluses translate to fifty-nine additional days of learning in reading and twenty-four more days in math.” In a state struggling with massive achievement gaps, these learning gains are bright rays of hope. Governor DeWine’s proposal rewards, strengthens, and encourages the replication of the schools that drive higher achievement for historically disadvantaged kids. As the budget bill moves through the General Assembly, legislators should enthusiastically approve these funds.
[1] A school’s sponsor must also be rated “effective” or “exemplary” in the state’s sponsor-evaluation system. This condition would likely apply to a small number charters; based on 2017–18 sponsor ratings, it excludes just twenty-one out of roughly 340 schools (mostly dropout recovery schools sponsored by districts). The sponsor criteria also apply to startup schools discussed later in this piece.
[2] ODE could make the supplemental payments very early in the 2019–20 school year—prior to the mid-September release of the 2018–19 report cards—and thus use 2017–18 ratings to determine eligibility.
[3] There would need to be a reappropriation of this funding stream for FYs 2022–23 for the third year to apply.
[4] More specifically, this includes any school with a CMO that has received a startup grant from either the U.S. Department of Education or the Charter School Growth Fund, or a quality CMO as determined by the Ohio Department of Education based on academic and financial reviews.
The past few weeks have seen a flurry of legislative activity related to Academic Distress Commissions (ADCs), Ohio’s mechanism for intervening in low-performing school districts. Governor DeWine’s state budget proposal includes language that would significantly alter the ADC model and include it among a menu of intervention options. House Bill 127, as amended, would eliminate ADCs altogether. Senate Bill 110 also seeks to change ADCs, though to a lesser extent than the other bills.
And then there’s House Bill 154. This legislation originally sought to replace ADCs with the mandatory implementation of community learning centers, a model that, according to state law, focuses on “a coordinated, community-based effort with community partners to provide comprehensive educational, developmental, family, and health services to students, families, and community members during school hours.” But just before the bill was to get its second hearing in front of the House Primary and Secondary Education Committee, its sponsors offered a completely revised version.
The updated bill does two things. First, it dissolves all current ADCs. This means the commissions that are in place in Youngstown, East Cleveland, and Lorain would cease to exist, and school district boards would reclaim authority over all district schools. Second, the bill replaces the ADC model with a school-based, locally-driven intervention mechanism. Schools that were previously part of an ADC and earned an F during the previous school year would be subject to this new intervention method starting on July 1, 2019. In July of the following year, any school statewide that received an overall grade of F during the previous year would be subject to the new law.
Here’s how it would work: Schools that earn an overall F are designated by the state superintendent as “in need of improvement.”[1] This identification requires the district board to establish a school improvement team comprised of administrators and teachers. The improvement team is then responsible for conducting a performance audit of the school that “reviews the needs of students, parents, teachers, and administrators.” As part of the audit, the team must seek input from parents and other community members from within the attendance zone of the building. Based on their findings, the team develops a school improvement plan that must be based on a “multi-tiered, evidence-based model.” The plan can—but is not required to—include measurable benchmarks in areas like promotion and dropout rates, student attendance, and graduation rates. Finalized plans must be submitted to the district board for approval by the final day of the school year. Prior to approval, the board is required to gather community feedback via at least one public hearing.
Like the ADC law before it, this new mechanism extends across multiple school years. While the ADC model gradually increased the power of an appointed CEO based on continued low performance, the new law keeps the local school board and the school improvement team in firm control of the intervention reins. Take a look:
So what happens to a school that still hasn’t made any progress by the end of four years? Well, nothing yet. The bill requires the state superintendent to work with the state board to “determine the best method to support school buildings that fail to meet improvement benchmarks.” They’re required to submit a report on their findings to the legislature by January 2020, presumably so that something can be put into law.
It might seem reasonable to require the board and the department to do some thorough research before putting anything into statute. But there are two major problems with that provision. First, an implication that something might be done in the future to address chronic low performers isn’t enough. The state has an obligation to families and taxpayers to step in when students aren’t being served well, and four years of consecutive F grades is a pretty clear indication that something is wrong. If local districts can’t improve on their own within four years, then the state needs to step up and intervene—and their method for doing so needs to be included in this bill. Second, the department and the board are the same folks that have championed weak graduation requirements that are harmful to low-income and minority students and created a strategic plan that purposely shies away from traditional academic measures and lets everyone off the hook. If the legislature wants to consider a plan created by these groups, they have every right to. But given their recent history and the fact that consistently poor performing schools are harmful to students, families, and communities, legislators need be ready and willing to reject anything that flies in the face of serious transparency and accountability.
Another aspect of House Bill 154 that has both positives and negatives is its shift from district-level to school-level intervention. If the bill becomes law, it will be low-performing schools—not entire districts—that face potential intervention. On the one hand, focusing on school buildings could mean more personalized reforms that are tailored to a much smaller number of students. Schools that are serving students well even though they may be located in a chronically low-performing district will be spared the upheaval of district intervention. And teacher and administrator buy-in may be easier to achieve since there will be a smaller number of folks to win over and plans will be crafted by the same people who will be responsible for implementing them with fidelity.
But focusing on schools instead of districts also means considerably more work for district administrators and staff. For example, the bill requires districts to hold public hearings to seek community feedback prior to approving improvement plans. In large districts that may have a large number of schools identified—say, Columbus or Cleveland—that will mean a lot of public hearings and a lot of plans to consider. A school-level focus will also likely stretch the capacity of the Ohio Department of Education, which must provide technical support to any improvement teams that request it. In the end, drilling down to the building level in this way could mean even less support for schools that need it the most.
A final aspect to consider is the bill’s provisions regarding school improvement plans. It’s good news that these plans must be based on multi-tiered, evidence-based models. In the fall of last year, Ohio released its brand new evidence-based clearinghouse along with some additional resources. This clearinghouse—as well as additional data and research completed by the Ohio Education Research Center—provides a strong foundation for schools that will need to draft improvement plans.
But the bill’s provisions regarding these plans are also missing some key elements. First, schools are not required to include measurable benchmarks in their plans. This is a serious oversight, since the only way to determine whether a plan is successful is to evaluate progress in comparison to measurable goals. Obviously the ultimate goal is for a school to earn an overall grade higher than an F. But to do so, schools will need to have smaller, quantifiable goals for a variety of areas.
Second, although the bill outlines a few of areas that could be the basis for benchmarks—including, but not limited to, creating a culture of academic success among students, student attendance, safety and discipline, promotion and dropout rates, and graduation rates—there are two glaring omissions from the list: student achievement and student growth. Given that achievement and growth are the most heavily weighted measures in determining a school’s overall grade, it seems nonsensical that improvement teams and plans wouldn’t be focused on improving these measures. It is also troubling that the bill doesn’t seem interested in requiring schools—whose sole purpose is to educate children—to track objective measures of academic progress.
Third, there is no mechanism for making sure that improvement plans are actually evidence-based. The bill requires that the district board and superintendent review the plan and seek community feedback prior to approval, but there is no objective entity that is charged with making sure plans are based on rigorous evidence. While it’s understandable and even wise to return control to local communities, such authority should include checks and balances. Prudence suggests it might be smart to have the department use its technical expertise to develop an expansive menu of evidence-based reforms that districts could choose from, though there should also be an appeals process in place in case a local plan is developed that seems promising but hasn’t yet shown widespread success.
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Overall, the amended House Bill 154 is a mixed bag. There are some provisions that are promising and deserve support, but others—such as ignoring achievement and growth or failing to answer “what next” after four years of failed local improvement efforts—are problematic.
As legislators consider this and other ADC-related bills, they would be wise to remember how high the stakes are for students and communities. The districts currently under ADC control have consistently weak academic growth, low college completion rates, and few students reaching proficiency in basic subjects. Some of the districts have been performing poorly for ten years or more. Their schools are producing graduates who aren’t prepared for college or the workplace—and families, communities, and local businesses are paying the price. They don’t need endless improvement timelines. They need a sense of hope, and a sense of urgency, now.
[1] This does not apply to charter schools—only to buildings that are operated by a city, local, or exempted village school district.
With less red tape to launching new schools, the charter model encourages bold, enterprising leaders to turn high-performing schools into successful networks. Today, terrific charter networks have emerged serving students of all backgrounds in places such as Boston, Denver, Newark, New York City, San Antonio, and Phoenix. States making intentional efforts to support quality charters have also seen impressive growth: For instance, in just six years, enrollment in Tennessee’s high-performing charters grew from approximately 1,500 to 13,000 students by the end of 2017.
Ohio, too, is home to several outstanding nonprofit networks, including the Breakthrough Schools in Cleveland; the Graham schools, KIPP, and the United Schools Network in Columbus; and DECA in our hometown of Dayton. While they aren’t the only reputable Ohio-based networks, these organizations have consistently produced stellar results for disadvantaged students. Yet these networks only educate 8,000 students, a drop in the bucket compared to the 250,000 plus students in Ohio’s largest cities, most of whom struggle mightily to meet state academic standards.
Simply put, Ohio needs more—lots more—great schools. And as other cities and states have taught us, rapidly building quality schools from scratch can be done, provided proper supports. That’s why Governor Mike DeWine’s $30 million proposal to support quality public charter schools holds such promise. These supplemental funds would enable high-performing charters to scale up and replicate so that more youngsters needing a great education might be served. The appropriation, however, isn’t a done deal. As legislators review the proposal, they should consider the benefits of approving these funds—and the lost opportunities should they demur.
Kickstarting new charter school formation
We at Fordham have expressed concerns about the dramatic slowdown in new school startups. The figure below shows the trend in the number of openings since the first charters opened in 1998–99. As you can see, the number of new school startups has fallen to record lows, with less than ten schools opening per year. Just nine charters opened this school year, while thirty-five schools closed at the end of 2017–18. With closures now far outpacing startups, overall charter enrollment has slid in recent years.
Figure 1: Charter startups in Ohio, FY 1999 through FY 2019
Sources: For FY 1999 through 2017, startup data are from the Fordham publication On the Right Track. For FY 2018, startups are tracked via Ohio Department of Education, Annual Reports on Community Schools and for FY 2019 from ODE’s community school payment reports (March 2019 file).
The slowdown could be explained by any number of factors. It may be due in part to more rigorous vetting by charter sponsors as they now face tougher accountability measures designed to prevent ill-conceived startups from opening. That’s a good thing. But weak incentives play a role, too. Facing well-known funding shortfalls and roadblocks to adequate facilities, charter leaders often don’t have the resources to replicate successful schools. To be clear, policymakers shouldn’t backtrack on accountability for sponsors and schools, but they also need to leaven risk-prevention policies with financial support and incentives that can spur the development of new schools. Without additional funding, Ohio will continue to see meager startup numbers—a shame given the urgent need for quality schools.
Turbocharging the growth of excellent homegrown networks
While the figure above reveals a disconcerting trend in new school growth, several of Ohio’s top charter networks have gradually expanded. Consider the figure below that shows recent enrollments among a select group of Ohio charter organizations. Breakthrough, the largest of these networks, has grown by about 1,000 students within the past five years (three new schools were opened), while KIPP has more than doubled by adding grade levels at its Columbus site. The funding stream proposed by Governor DeWine would help accelerate the growth among networks like these that have already shown an appetite for replication and proven their models can scale.
Figure 2: Enrollment growth in selected high-performing charter networks in Ohio, FY 2015 to 2019
Source: Ohio Department of Education, Community School Directory and Annual Reports on Community Schools. Note: This figure displays enrollment among charters schools currently in these networks (it doesn’t include any schools affiliated in previous years but are no longer so).
Making Ohio an attractive locale for quality out-of-state networks
Great homegrown charter networks are making inroads, but they can’t be expected to do it all. As noted in the introduction, there are any number of excellent charter organizations across the nation whose presence would benefit Buckeye youngsters. But facing skimpy operational funding and weak facility supports, Ohio remains an inhospitable environment for out-of-state networks. In fact, only one of the nation’s finest charter networks—KIPP—has chosen to plant a school in Ohio. Without more attractive funding policies, Ohio will continue to be “flyover country” as top-performing networks skip past in favor of more welcoming locales. Just as Ohio tries to enact economically competitive policies to draw employers and residents, so also does it need to enact policies that make the state attractive for charter networks. Governor DeWine’s funding proposal would be a great start toward making Ohio a friendlier destination.
Increasing quality options for students who need them the most
In the end, these supplemental charter funds should be leveraged to drive higher achievement. It may seem like a broken record, but the academic struggles of students in Ohio’s urban schools cannot be overlooked. As a simple reminder—and see here for more data—the figure below shows seventh-grade math proficiency rates among students in the Big Eight school districts. It reveals low proficiency rates across the board that range from a heartbreaking 19 percent in Youngstown to 28 percent in Cleveland to 40 percent in Cincinnati, all rates that fall well below the state average.
Figure 3: Seventh grade math proficiency rates, Big Eight districts, 2016–17 and 2017–18
Source: Checking Ohio’s Educational Vital Signs (2018).
It remains a sad truth that these results are part reflections of poverty, part reflections of subpar schools. But there are rays of hope: Ohio’s brick-and-mortar charter schools are more effectively closing these achievement gaps than their district counterparts. And the best of them—charters in networks like those discussed above—are making a world of a difference for their students.
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Ohio needs more great schools, fast. The swiftest, most efficient way to launch them is through the charter school model. With stronger charter accountability, state policymakers have put in place important measures that keep low-performing schools from sprouting. But this is only half the battle. Ohio leaders also need to step up and encourage quality charters to replicate. To do this, they need to provide the incentives and resources that allow them to do it right. Governor DeWine’s proposal is a huge step forward and deserves our full support.
The Data Quality Campaign, an organization dedicated to advocating for effective educational data policy and use, recently released its third comprehensive review of school report cards in all fifty states and D.C. This year’s is particularly important because it marks the first time that states are required to report information under ESSA requirements.
Overall, DQC finds that the majority of states have report card systems that are easier to find and use than in years past. Forty-two states have report cards that, because they appear within the top three results of an internet search, are considered easy to access. Report cards are also easier to use: Many families now access school information using mobile devices, so it’s good news that thirty-one states have a mobile-friendly version of their report cards. Thirty-five states also offer downloadable data, which allow families, policymakers, and analysts alike to dig deeper into the numbers.
DQC notes that several states have made significant changes to their systems. The places that boasted the biggest improvements focused on improving design, including more and better data and experimenting with different processes, such as partnering with external vendors. In general, three basic design approaches are used by states: 1) the one-stop shop, which organizes report card data in a single resource; 2) the parent-facing front door, a landing page for moms and dads that links to a separate, more wide-ranging data site; and 3) the data hub, which typically takes the form of a dashboard and allows users to explore data in different ways. Many states have also started providing helpful definitions for various technical terms and data elements. When this is done well, definitions are easy to understand and summarize why the data matters.
Despite these bright spots, there is still plenty of room for growth. According to DQC, many states need to work harder to make report cards easy for all citizens to understand. Only fifteen translate information into a language other than English, for example, and text is often written at a postsecondary reading level, which DQC measured by using hemingwayapp.com. Many report cards also lack critical information about student performance. A whopping forty-two states do not include disaggregated achievement data for at least one federally required subgroup, and twenty-one still don’t disaggregate data based on gender—a requirement that’s been in place for twenty years.
Many states also lack important non-academic data on school report cards. Over half exclude discipline data, such as suspensions and expulsions. Twenty-seven forgo postsecondary enrollment numbers, though several states do report that data in places other than school report cards. And twenty-six states lack data on the number of inexperienced teachers, teachers with emergency or provisional credentials, or educators who are teaching outside their field of expertise.
A few states are singled out as making considerable progress since DQC’s last review. Mississippi, for instance, released a brand new design that is more comprehensive and easier to navigate than its previous iteration. Texas’s report cards offer parents a “show me how it works” feature that breaks down each indicator with simple illustrations and text explanations. And Pennsylvania includes data on the variety of pathways that students take after high school, including disaggregated military enlistment rates and the number of students who entered the state’s workforce.
Ohio isn’t listed as a state that’s made a lot of progress, but that’s because the Buckeye State is already well known for its top-notch report cards. Back in 2014, the Education Commission of the States asked researchers, parents, and experts to identify whether report cards in all fifty states were easy to find, easy to understand, and included all the essential indicators for measuring performance. Ohio earned nearly perfect scores and was “lauded for its graphics and for being easy to read and understand.” Analysis provided by DQC reinforces Ohio’s high marks. The state’s report cards are mobile-friendly, updated with the most recent test score data, downloadable, and available in languages other than English. Ohio also includes measures other than test scores, such as teacher effectiveness and postsecondary enrollment.
But like every state, Ohio has some room to grow. In DQC’s dataset, Ohio is identified as one of forty-two states that doesn’t include disaggregated achievement data for at least one of the federally required subgroups. In Ohio’s case, DQC claims it’s all the subgroups—including race and ethnicity, gender, students with disabilities, and economically disadvantaged students.
For the record, that’s not entirely accurate. It’s true that Ohio doesn’t disaggregate its achievement indicator by subgroup, but that’s because the state uses a separate indicator—the gap closing component—instead. Gap closing is a measure that reports how students in certain subgroups perform on state tests and their schools’ graduation rates compared to the collective performance of all students in the state. The component doesn’t count all of the federally required subgroups (migrant, homeless, and foster care students weren’t included on the most recent report card), but it does contain the majority.
The gap closing component brings Ohio into compliance with federal law. But DQC is onto something when they point out that disaggregating achievement data in a component that’s completely separate from the actual achievement indicator might make finding and understanding the data more difficult for families and the general public. In fact, many Ohioans have called gap closing the “least useful” report card measure because it’s so notoriously complicated.
DQC is right that parents and taxpayers need information about how subgroups are performing, and they’re right that data should be communicated simply and clearly. Forcing Ohioans to consider a measure that’s completely separate from the achievement component and hard to understand is a disservice. Overall, though, Ohioans should feel good about their state’s report card system. For the most part it’s clear, easy to understand, and easily accessible.
For nearly two decades, the National Council on Teacher Quality (NCTQ) has published research, analyses, and evaluations on various aspects of the teaching profession. Their Teacher Prep Reviews, arguably the most well-known aspect of their work, have evaluated and ranked over two thousand teacher training programs spanning undergraduate, graduate, and alternative offerings. Despite the fact that thousands of teaching candidates enroll in preparation programs each year, the vast majority of future teachers select a training program without knowing how well it will prepare them for the classroom. Given how hard teaching is, and how high the stakes are for students, this lack of data is alarming.
The fantastic staff at NCTQ decided to fill this gap by creating a guidebook for prospective teachers. To do so, NCTQ president Kate Walsh joined forces with Dan Brown, a National Board Certified Teacher who previously ran Educators Rising, a national network of more than 45,000 teenagers who are aspiring educators. They leverage the experience of teachers from Teach Plus, an organization that trains and empowers thousands of high-performing teachers to fill leadership and advocacy roles, to offer real-world examples and feedback about the teacher-training process.
The final product, Start Here to Become a Teacher, is nearly two hundred pages’ worth of detailed information about what it takes to become a great teacher and why picking the right preparation program matters. The page-one promise—to provide readers with “unique advice about teaching found nowhere else”—is not an empty one. This guidebook is the first of its kind, and it accomplishes its goal admirably.
There are a few sections in particular that stand out. First is chapter two’s “Myths About Teaching: Responding to the Haters,” a laundry list of problematic assumptions that most teachers have heard at least once in their lifetime (this former teacher included). The straightforward rebuttals provided after each statement should be helpful for aspiring educators who may be hearing such things from their (probably well-intentioned) parents, professors, or friends.
Another standout is chapter three, “The Best Way to Become a Teacher.” While most “how to become a teacher” guides consider earning a bachelor’s degree in education from a four-year institution to be the premier option, this book recognizes that that there are plenty of other ways to get into the classroom. Readers are given an analyses of the pros, cons, and costs of all of these routes—not just the traditional undergraduate four-year experience, but also graduate schools, alternative programs, residencies, and online programs. A brief explainer on the availability of loans and loan-forgiveness programs for teachers is helpful, as is the chart listing the requirements each state has for entry into undergraduate programs.
In chapter four, the authors acknowledge that teachers earn about 17 percent less on average than other professions that require a comparable amount of education. That in and of itself isn’t groundbreaking information. Any aspiring teacher who saw coverage of the recent teacher walkouts on the news probably assumed as much. But the authors break the conversation down to a more practical level by providing a fifty-state breakdown of starting salaries in sample districts and the price of renting a one-bedroom apartment in that area. This is exactly the kind of real-life question that an aspiring teacher might have while deciding whether teaching makes economic sense. In fact, the nuanced way in which the authors handle the complex issue of teacher pay—including a user-friendly overview of how salary schedules work and how benefits for a typical public school teacher compare to those of a professional in the private sector—should prove critical for those weighing whether to pursue a teaching career.
But the real heart of this publication is the information about what makes a quality program and which programs meet those standards. The authors identify three key aspects of teaching—subject knowledge, professional knowledge, and practice—and then break down the content and skills teachers will need to learn to master each one. Like the earlier discussion on teacher pay, this analysis is a refreshingly honest depiction of a complicated reality. The authors don’t shy away from identifying areas where the majority of programs fall short, and they offer realistic suggestions for how aspiring teachers can fill in gaps on their own.
They also identify programs that are doing an excellent job of meeting what NCTQ has identified as markers of quality—things like a rigorous admissions process, training in classroom management, and high quality opportunities to practice teaching. Unlike the teacher prep reviews, however, this guidebook doesn’t just list programs’ grades on these standards. It also offers facts about the university or college and financial information about tuition, debt, and the typical salary of a new teacher in that state. Though not representative, some program overviews also include a statement from the dean and feedback from actual teaching candidates who are enrolled in the program.
This guidebook offers aspiring teachers a thorough look under the hood of teacher preparation. So thorough, in fact, that it even covers the ineffable: the reasons why teachers choose to become teachers. That’s how you know this is the real deal.
SOURCE: Dan Brown, Rob Rickenbrode, and Kate Walsh, “Start Here to Become a Teacher,” NCTQ (March 2019).
Editor’s Note: Back in September 2018, awaiting the election of our next governor, we at the Fordham Institute began developing a set of policy proposals that we believe can lead to increased achievement and greater opportunities for Ohio students. This is one of those policy proposals.
With Mike DeWine sworn in as Ohio’s 70th governor, and with his administration now well underway, we are proud to roll out the full set of our education policy proposals. You can download the full document, titled Fulfilling the Readiness Promise: Twenty-five education policy ideas for Ohio, at this link, or you can access the individual policy proposals from the links provided here.
Proposal: Ensure that Advanced Placement (AP), International Baccalaureate (IB), and industry credentialing exams are provided at no cost to low-income students.
Background: AP and IB programs have offered high-achieving students the opportunity to take rigorous coursework while in high school. Their assessment programs also open opportunities for students to earn college credit before matriculating. In 2016, about 2.5 million U.S. students took AP exams in subjects such as biology, calculus, and English. The exams, however, are not inexpensive—about $100 per test—and students typically pay out of pocket to sit for them. For low-income students seeking to prove their knowledge and abilities on these exams—and potentially earn college credit—the assessment costs might prove prohibitive. To provide assistance, the College Board discounts AP exam prices for low-income students, and the federal government previously further defrayed exam fees for low-income pupils. However, Congress eliminated this program in 2016, leaving it unclear whether low-income students would continue to receive this form of financial assistance (districts could still use their federal dollars to provide help but are not required to do so). To its credit, the ODE stepped in for 2017–18 and covered most of the testing costs for low-income students. Despite these efforts, it’s not certain moving forward whether low-income students will continue to receive the financial assistance needed to take these exams. Although public attention is often focused on AP exams and fees, several of Ohio’s industry credentialing programs, such as the programs for becoming a certified logistics technician and physical therapy aide, require students to pass standardized assessments that charge testing fees.
Proposal rationale: AP and IB courses and exams are widely respected for their rigorous academic content, are critical for building competitive college applications, and offer an opportunity to earn credit while in high school. To fully take advantage of AP or IB programs, students should have the opportunity to take the summative assessments, regardless of family income. Although this proposal cannot solve all problems with access to AP/IB courses, covering the full exam costs would be a step forward in supporting advanced opportunities for Ohio’s most able low-income students. Likewise, assessment fees should not discourage low-income students from pursuing industry credentials that could open career opportunities.
Cost: The state should allocate $5 million per year to fund this cost-reimbursement program. This amount should cover AP/IB and credentialing testing fees for low-income students (after any test providers’ discounts are applied).
Resources: For discussion on expanding access to AP and IB programs, see Christina Theokas and Reid Saaris’ Finding America’s Missing AP and IB Students, published by Education Trust (2013); for more on Ohio’s current policy for reimbursing exam costs, see ODE’s “Advanced Placement and International Baccalaureate Test Fee Reimbursement”; and for other states’ reimbursement policies on AP exams, see College Board’s “Changes to AP Federal Funding Under ESSA.”
Editor’s Note: Back in September 2018, awaiting the election of our next governor, we at the Fordham Institute began developing a set of policy proposals that we believe can lead to increased achievement and greater opportunities for Ohio students. This is one of those policy proposals.
With Mike DeWine sworn in as Ohio’s 70th governor, and with his administration now well underway, we are proud to roll out the full set of our education policy proposals. You can download the full document, titled Fulfilling the Readiness Promise: Twenty-five education policy ideas for Ohio, at this link, or you can access the individual policy proposals from the links provided here.
Proposal: Repeal the provision that allows districts to negotiate key responsibilities such as hiring, evaluating, disciplining, and retaining their teaching and nonteaching staff.
Background: State law (ORC 4117.08) outlines the matters that are subject to collective bargaining between school districts and teachers’ unions. It naturally and properly permits districts and unions to negotiate wages and hours, along with terms and other conditions of employment. This same statute, however, also lists several items that are fundamental responsibilities of school leaders—known as “matters of inherent managerial policy.” These include the ability to create organizational budgets; hire, evaluate, supervise, and discipline staff; and assign and promote employees. Yet the very provision that appears to empower school management immediately allows districts, should they so choose, to negotiate these basic responsibilities through collective bargaining. Many districts do indeed bargain away these inherent managerial rights, as evidenced by hundred-page contracts that often spell out elaborate employee grievance, transfer, and dismissal procedures—among other work rules—that restrict school leaders’ ability to manage and support a team of excellent educators.
Proposal rationale: School and district leaders should have the ability to effectively manage their staff in ways that promote a culture of excellence. Yet as Paolo DeMaria observed in a 2015 paper published prior to becoming state superintendent, “There are too many examples where, in times of financial constraints, districts have bargained away their management rights.” Repealing this provision would ensure this doesn’t happen and better safeguard the management prerogatives needed to make decisions based on the needs of their schools and students, apart from excessively detailed work rules spelled out in contracts. Such restrictive contract provisions often serve to protect low-performing employees and tie the hands of principals when it comes to filling open positions, as they are often forced under contract rules to hire educators according to seniority, regardless of their performance or organizational fit.
Cost: No fiscal impact on the state budget.
Resources: For discussion on collective bargaining’s impact on school management, see Frederick Hess and Martin West’s report A Better Bargain: Overhauling Teacher Collective Bargaining for the 21st Century, published by the Program on Education Policy & Governance (2005); for more on teacher-transfer rules, see the 2005 New Teacher Project report Unintended Consequences: The Case for Reforming the Staffing Rules in Urban Teachers Union Contracts by Jessica Levin and colleagues; and for brief comments on Ohio’s collective-bargaining law, see Getting out of the Way: Education Flexibility to Boost Innovation and Improvement in Ohio, a report written by Education First’s Paolo DeMaria and colleagues and published by the Fordham Institute (2015)
NOTE: The Finance Subcommittee on Primary and Secondary Education of the Ohio House of Representatives today heard testimony on HB 166, the state’s biennial budget bill. Fordham’s Chad Aldis was a witness at this hearing and here are his written remarks regarding aspects of the budget and on the portion of the bill known as the “Ohio Fair School Funding Plan”.
Chairman Cupp, Chairman Patterson, and members of the House Finance Subcommittee on Primary and Secondary Education, thank you for the opportunity to provide testimony today on House Bill 166 and the “Ohio Fair School Funding Plan.”
My name is Chad Aldis, and I am the Vice President for Ohio Policy and Advocacy at the Thomas B. Fordham Institute. The Fordham Institute is an education-focused nonprofit that conducts research, analysis, and policy advocacy with offices in Columbus, Dayton, and Washington, D.C. Our Dayton office is also a community school sponsor.
For years, educators have pleaded for lawmakers to slow down and refrain from changing education laws and policy every year. These requests have for the most part gone unheeded. Governor DeWine’s budget though comes as close as any in a very long time to giving the education community a chance to catch up. We think this is a wise approach and encourage you to follow this lead as you contemplate amendments to House Bill 166.
DeWine Budget as Introduced
As noted, the education portions of the budget aren’t particularly policy heavy and don’t place much in the way of new mandates or requirements on public schools. That’s a good thing. There are a few changes though that we’d like to highlight.
“Ohio Fair School Funding Plan”
Other Key Issues
A couple of other topics generating debate are graduation requirements and state report cards. We think both of these areas are significant enough that they should be addressed via separate bills rather than in the budget with abbreviated discussion and testimony.
Thank you again for the opportunity to provide testimony. I’m happy to answer any questions that you may have.
Are you passionate about education reform and interested in growing your development and nonprofit chops? Energetic, highly organized, and comfortable handling varied responsibilities in a dynamic work environment? If so, you might be perfect as the Development Associate in Fordham's Washington, DC or Columbus, OH office. It is a great opportunity for someone hoping to improve America’s future.
About the Thomas B. Fordham Institute
The Thomas B. Fordham Institute is one of the nation’s premier education policy think tanks. We advance:
We promote education reform by:
Responsibilities
The development associate will report to Fordham’s Chief of Staff and will work primarily with that individual and Fordham’s president, as well as with select staff across our D.C. and Ohio offices. Specific responsibilities include:
Qualifications
Successful candidates will be highly motivated, detail-oriented, and comfortable juggling multiple tasks and deadlines, and will have at least 1–3 years of prior experience with development, fundraising, and/or project management. Bachelor’s degree required.
Other qualifications include:
This position may be based out of either our Washington, DC or our Columbus, OH office.
The Thomas B. Fordham Institute is an equal opportunity employer. Please browse our website for more information about our organization.
To Apply
Please submit a cover letter, resume, and brief (no more than 3-page) writing sample here.
The deadline for applications is May 15, 2019.
